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► A typology of environmental policy and regulatory instruments has been reﬁned through interviews with UK policy makers.
► Factors affecting policy makers' choices of instrument are identiﬁed.
► Direct regulation is considered necessary in many areas, to reduce environmental risks and tackle poor performance.
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Policy innovationBetter regulation seeks to extend existing policy and regulatory outcomes at less burden for the actors
involved. No single intervention will deliver all environmental outcomes. There is a paucity of evidence on
what works why, when and with whom. We examine how a sample (n=33) of policy makers select policy
and regulatory instruments, through a case study of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(Defra), UK. Policy makers have a wide range of instruments at their disposal and are seeking ways to harness
the inﬂuence of non-governmental resources to encourage good environmental behaviour. The relevance
of each inﬂuence varies as risk and industry characteristics vary between policy areas. A recent typology of
policy and regulatory instruments has been reﬁned. Direct regulation is considered necessary in many
areas, to reduce environmental risks with conﬁdence and to tackle poor environmental performance.
Co-regulatory approaches may provide important advantages to help accommodate uncertainty for emerging
policy problems, providing a mechanism to develop trusted evidence and to reﬁne objectives as problems are
better understood.
© 2012 Published by Elsevier B.V.1. Introduction
Around the world policy makers, who design and implement
policy and regulation, face the challenge of choosing among a range
of policy and regulatory instruments to achieve their governments'
environmental and economic objectives, pursuing ‘clean’ or ‘dirty’
development paths as their economies grow (Esty and Porter, 2005).
The term ‘regulation’ is used here in its broadest sense to include all
forms of social control, including those that harnesswider social forces
beyond government, including the inﬂuence of businesses and other
actors in society (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999). ‘Instrument’
is used to refer to a component part that makes up regulation, such
as licensing, taxes or public information campaigns. Instruments
include traditional direct regulation typically based on licensing and
inspection, economic instruments such as taxes and subsidies, ap-
proaches intended to change behaviour through better information+44 1234 754036.
rd).
sevier B.V.provision, approaches negotiated between government and industry,
relying on industry self-regulation, and seeking to increase knowledge
and capacity. Variants exist within each of these broad categories
(Table 1).
Direct (‘command and control’) regulation has been associated with
signiﬁcant improvements in environmental conditions in industrialised
nations. However, concern that direct regulationmay inhibit innovation
and international competitiveness has led governments to seek alter-
native approaches to achieving environmental objectives (see, e.g. BIS,
2012). Governments have sought to improve the implementation
of regulation using a risk-based approach, targeting regulatory effort
towards the greatest risks (e.g. Gouldson et al., 2009; Pollard et al.,
2004, 2008; Hampton, 2005). Commentators have also observed a
shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ as governments seek to harness
the inﬂuence of wider social forces to inﬂuence the behaviour of indi-
viduals and businesses (Gouldson, 2008; Jordan et al., 2005) by sharing
responsibilities for managing public risk and associated costs. In prac-
tice, instruments rarely operate in isolation; instead forming a comple-
mentary mix that inﬂuences behaviour through different levers across
multiple actors.
Table 1
Typology of policy and regulatory instruments (Taylor et al., 2012).
Type Variant
Direct ‘command and control’
regulation
Ambient pollution requirements
Input restrictions and output quotas
Non-transferable emissions licences
Technology controls
Zoning/location controls
Economic instruments Taxes and subsidies
Tradable rights
Payments
Information based instruments Targeted information provision
Naming and shaming/faming
Registration, labelling and certiﬁcation
Co-regulation and self-regulation Voluntary regulation
Covenants and negotiated agreements
Private corporate regulation
Private professional regulation
Self-regulation
Civic regulation
Support mechanisms and
capacity building
Research and knowledge generation
Demonstration projects and knowledge diffusion
Network building and joint problem solving
Table 2
33 policymakers were interviewed in 28 interviews across a range of policy domains.
Policy domain Number of interviewees
Exotic animal disease control 1
Climate change adaptation planning 1
Sustainable consumption and production 2
Local environmental control 2
Farming Regulation Task Force 2
Biodiversity 1
Food 2
Marine strategy 1
Common ﬁsheries policy 1
Peat and Soils 1
Contaminated land 1
Food and Environment Research Agency (FERA) 1
Noise 1
Chemicals 3
Marine licensing 1
Livestock and livestock products 1
Cross-cutting 1
Water in the environment 1
Water quality 1
EU negotiation coordination 1
Landscape and forestry 1
Crops and Agricultural Products 1
Flood risk management 2
Animal welfare 1
Waste management 2
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programme for regulatory reform across member states and in recent
years has sought to further the ambitions of the ‘better regulation’
agenda towards ‘smart regulation’ (European Commission, 2010). The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
similarly has promoted regulatory reform across its members (OECD,
2008). Emerging economies experiencing rapid industrialisation and
economic growth are also tackling the challenge of designing effective
regulatory frameworks to deliver sustainable development. For exam-
ple, China has recently announced its Plan for Energy Conservation
and Emission Reduction for the 12th Five-Year Plan Period (Ministry
of Environmental Protection, People's Republic of China, 2012), which
includes strengthened pollution controls and reduction targets for spe-
ciﬁc sectors, as well as the promotion of environmental management
labels for vehicles.
In England, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs (Defra) develops environmental policy and regulation across
multiple policy domains. Regulation is implemented by a network
of regulatory agencies including the Environment Agency (EA) and
regulators in local government. Programmes of work that drive
regulatory reform have been pursued by successive governments
in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK)
over recent decades. The current ‘Red Tape Challenge’ (Cabinet
Ofﬁce, 2012a) seeks to reduce regulatory burdens through a process
in which policy makers, politicians and the public scrutinise existing
legislation to identify ‘what should be scrapped, what should be
saved and what should be simpliﬁed’. Simultaneously, the UK govern-
ment is aiming to reduce government spending while devolving more
decision-making to a local level, including through voluntary civic
action (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011).
Policy makers and regulators face the challenge of selecting suitable
instruments to encourage green growth (OECD, 2011), reduce regulato-
ry burdens, support wider government ﬁscal and social objectives,
and maintain or improve environmental quality. However, they are
hampered in their pursuit of ‘evidence based policy’ (Solesbury, 2001)
by a lack of evidence on which policy and regulatory instruments
work, why, when and with whom (Taylor et al., 2012). Our research
seeks to help address this gap by answering the following research
questions for a sample of policymaking practitioners: (i) What types
of policy and regulatory instrument can policy makers choose
between?; (ii)Which factors inﬂuence the effectiveness of these instru-
ments in practice?; (iii) How do policy makers select instruments to
deliver better policy and regulation?; and (iv) What does this imply
for the skills and tools required by policy makers?Answers to these questions are likely to set a richer context for the
Red Tape Challenge programme for environmental policy and regula-
tion and inform a route map by which a revised mix of interventions,
of lower burden, can be designed and defended.
2. Methods
2.1. Rationale
The research used a case study approach (Yin, 2009; Summerill
et al., 2010) using semi-structured interviews with policy makers to
gather qualitative data. This interview approach allows open discus-
sions to reveal nuances of policymaking practice without straying
too far from the research objectives. Cycles of coding were used to
elicit results from this data.
2.2. Selection of interviewees
The case of a single government department (Defra) was studied.
Defra has primary responsibility for English environmental policy
development across a wide range of policy domains, and may be con-
sidered a critical case (Yin, 2009) for testing theories of environmen-
tal policy practice. Interviewees (Table 2) were senior policy makers
selected to provide insight into the practices within their policy
domain. It should be noted that policy makers in the UK government
often circulate between policy domains during their career, so some
interviewees drew on wider experience. In line with Yin's (2009) ra-
tionale for single case study research, the aim was not for statistical
generalisation, rather, to determine whether established theory pro-
vides correct propositions for this critical case, or whether alternative
explanations are more relevant, challenging or extending theory.
2.3. Collection of data
Semi-structured interviews (33 individuals in 28 meetings) were
conducted to collect narrative during September and October 2011,
and lasted between 30 min and 1 h. Interviews were conducted
using open-ended questions, structured around research questions
examining the range of policy and regulatory interventions available
to policy makers, their experience of effective and ineffective policy
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Fig. 1. Analysis approach, after Summerill et al. (2010).
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lection and effectiveness. Prior to each interview, interviewees were
provided with a brieﬁng note explaining the purpose of the research
and assuring their anonymity, listing the questions to be addressed
during the discussion and presenting a typology of policy and regula-
tory instruments established through a prior literature review (Taylor
et al., 2012; summarised in Table 1). Interviews were recorded with
permission using a digital voice recorder and transcribed verbatim.
Relevant documentation concerning the policy and regulation within
policy areas was obtained, and was supplemented with direct obser-
vation, conversation and collection of ﬁeld notes.
2.4. Data analysis
Data analysis was performed through a systematic process of
coding, annotation andmemoing using NVIVO 9™ computer assisted
qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) (Bazeley, 2007; Miles and
Huberman, 1994). A stepwise approach (Fig. 1) was used for coding
narrative data to identify descriptions of characteristics of or interac-
tions between actors (e.g. policy makers, regulators, businesses) that
affect instrument selection or effectiveness, and recurring concepts
(e.g. cost, fairness, risk) used to explain the choice of policy instruments.Table 3
Summary of respondent opinions on instrument typology.
Number of interviewees Summary of opinions Detailed
14 Considered typology to be representative of options
available to policy makers, or raised no objections
“I think y
“I'm sure
they're fa
15 Provided proposals for reﬁnements Include “
Include “
Include “
Other cla
3 No comment One pers
1 Questioned logic of existing structure Thought
the exam
regulator
“technoloThis coding approach was used to ensure that a representative
range of interactions and explanatory concepts referred to by inter-
viewees was captured, providing a well-grounded data set to inform
inductive theory development. The coding was then reduced to a set
of explanatory themes. The development of these themes reﬂects
the ‘theoretical sensitivity’ (Kelle, 2005) of the researchers, informed
by a literature review undertaken prior to the interviews (Taylor et
al., 2012). Comparison between the themes identiﬁed through the
literature review and the themes reduced from the interview data
has been used to corroborate the relevance of existing theory to the
interviewees' explanations of policy and regulatory instrument selec-
tion in practice. The results of this analysis are reﬂected in the text.
3. Results and discussion
Table 3 summarises respondents' opinions on the range of policy
and regulatory instruments they can choose from, with reference to
the typology of instruments provided during the interviews. Table 4
lists factors identiﬁed by policy makers that inﬂuence the effective-
ness of instruments and how many respondents discussed them,
and summarises the beneﬁts and limitations of these factors. Fig. 2
illustrates the actors and interactions that policy makers consider
during instrument selection. Table 5 lists other factors affecting the
choice of instruments, the number of respondents who discussed
them, and summarises respondents' views on these factors.
3.1. Typology of instruments available to policy makers
Interviewees were asked to comment on the typology of instru-
ments provided at Appendix A (including revisions applied following
interviews). In general, policy makers felt that the typology provided
an accurate summary of the range of interventions available, and
were able to identify examples of different variants used in practice
by reference to it (Table 3).
Several respondents commented that the typology would be a use-
ful prompt for policy makers considering options for regulatory reform.
One respondent was concerned that if the typology was used as an in-
strument selection check-list by policy makers, it could constrain their
creativity and openness to new ideas. It was also clear from the discus-
sion that the presentation of instruments in a list fails to communicate
the reality of instruments working in an interrelated mix.
The policy areas covered during interviewswere primarily concerned
with themanagement of risks to the environment (e.g. biodiversity loss,
unsustainable consumption of natural resources) and risks to humans
arising from environmental conditions (e.g. ﬂood damage, losses from
animal disease, health risks arising from pollution). Defra also has re-
sponsibility for the regulation of economic performance of some sectors
(e.g. thewater industry), but economic regulationwas rarely discussed.
In one case the interviewee felt that the typology was not very relevant
for their policy area because it concerned environmental rather than
economic regulation.comments and illustrative quotes
ou look like you've covered, yes, all the different categories in quite a useful way.”
some of them would probably span more than one category but I imagine that
irly comprehensive one way or another.”
codes of practice” (3)
insurance” (3)
do nothing” (1)
riﬁcations (10)
on in group responded on behalf of others present.
the categorisation and naming of instruments should be further reﬁned. Highlighted
ple of “voluntary regulation”, which is a term generally used to describe an overall
y strategy rather than to specify a type of instrument (like “taxes and subsidies” or
gy controls”) as it has been used in the typology.
Table 4
Summary analysis of impact of factors inﬂuencing achievement of environmental policy and regulatory objectives.
Factor inﬂuencing effectiveness
(number of interviewees referring to factor)
Potential beneﬁts to achieving environmental objectives
from policy maker perspective
Potential limitations to achieving environmental objectives
from policy maker perspective
Industry motivations and attitudes
towards compliance (28)
Leading businesses may pursue positive environmental
behaviour independently, e.g. in pursuit of corporate
social responsibility objectives.
Policy objectives may conﬂict with business objectives,
undermining regulatory effectiveness.
Deliberate non-compliance undermines regulatory
effectiveness.
Individual motivations, capabilities
and attitudes towards compliance (26)
Pro-environmental attitudes of public may inﬂuence
other actors.
Direct regulation often infeasible as not possible to enforce.
Bounded rationality may inhibit behaviour change;
“behavioural interventions” may be required.
Inﬂuence of conditions along supply
chains (23)
Can extend policy inﬂuence beyond national boundaries. Businesses unlikely to enforce standards to extent of limiting
supply.Powerful inﬂuence in some sectors (e.g. food retail,
government procurement). Higher procurement standards may be expensive for government.
Regulator capability (23) Can prove more credible than central government in
providing advice and guidance to inﬂuence behaviour
change.
Lack of capability or resources directly limits effectiveness.
Can provide expertise to address localised problems.
Industry capability (20) Greater capability may reduce the need for government
intervention.
Lack of capability reduces regulatory effectiveness.
Strength of public buying decisions
and other public inﬂuences (19)
Considered very powerful in some sectors where public
concern is high, and retailers compete on basis of
environmental claims (e.g. food).
Sensitive to loss of trust in environmental claims or low
levels of public concern.
Consumers may become confused as environmental claims
proliferate.
Regulatory threats, of harder regulatory
regime or enforcement action (14)
Can motivate action to avoid harder regulation,
or to avoid punishment.
Impact may be undermined by lack of political will to regulate.
Credibility and therefore impact may be undermined by lack
of enforcement resources.
Measures may not bring about behaviour change despite
being easy to inspect and enforce (e.g. “tick box” exercises).
Industry capacity to self-regulate (10) Self-regulation may reduce the need for government
involvement.
Self-regulation may not be viable in large diverse industries.
Scrutiny of business environmental
performance by NGOs and media (7)
Can publicise successes and failures. May lack focus on lower-proﬁle policy objectives.
Can have stronger inﬂuence than government
in some policy domains.
Objectives or activities may conﬂict with government
objectives.
Investor and insurer inﬂuence on
businesses (7)
Can act directly on business ﬁnancial drivers. External investor inﬂuence not relevant for privately owned
businesses.
Investor risk perceptions may lead to lack of investment.
Insurer risk perceptions may lead to lack of private insurance
provision.
Politicians extolling better
environmental performance (5)
Can catalyse action. May misdirect effort.
Can publicise positive initiatives.
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as per Appendix A, may be considered to be a useful aide-mémoire
for discussions about regulatory reform for environmental risks, and a
workable structure for organising evidence about regulatory practice.
However, it was also apparent that the process of instrument selection
in practice is not formalised, and is complex and nuanced. Analysis
of discussions revealed a range of considerations that policy makers
take into account when developing or changing environmental policy,
including:
• the suitability of instruments to tackle different types of market
failures and to manage public risks;
• the extent to which instruments harness the inﬂuence of industry,
civil society and government actors to maximise their impact;
• the design of instruments to provide necessary degrees of ﬂexibil-
ity and to reinforce each other in the overall policy mix;
• the alignment of instruments with wider social and political
requirements.
Respondents also commented on the evidence and skills required
for effective policymaking. These ﬁndings are discussed in detail
below.3.2. Selecting instruments to tacklemarket failures andmanage public risks
3.2.1. Use of economic concepts (e.g. market failure) to explain instrument
selection
When discussing reasons for choosing particular instruments, 12
respondents explicitly referred to economic concepts (public goods,
information failures, market failures, externalities, property rights,
polluter pays principle) as reasons for public intervention, or reasons
why a particular instrument had been selected. These economic con-
cepts were used in discussion about sustainable consumption and
production, noise, waste management and food and agriculture.
Under UK government guidance, government intervention may
be justiﬁed to tackle market failures, government failures, or to manage
public risks (HM Treasury, 2003). Experience suggests that different
instruments are appropriate for different forms of market failure
(Perman et al., 2003). For example, market failures due to asymmetries
of information may be tackled through interventions that improve the
availability of information, such as mandatory business performance
reporting through company accounts, or labelling schemes to improve
information available to consumers. These results indicate that models
of instrument performance from the environmental economics literature
Regulatory 
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Policy 
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Fig. 2. Summary of key actors and interactions that policy makers consider during instrument selection.
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policy problems and rationale for instrument selection.
3.2.2. Use of risk concepts to explain instrument selection
23 of 33 interviewees discussed risk concepts extensively when
discussing the selection of appropriate instruments, notably in theTable 5
Summary analysis of other factors affecting choice of instruments.
Other factors affecting choice of instruments Summary of respondent views
Cost (31) Achieving cost-effective regulation was a ce
of contaminated land, soil erosion, animal a
management, reservoir safety and investm
regulation of catchment sensitive farming,
land owners to prevent water pollution and
products, waste reduction and resource efﬁ
European Union (EU) and World
Trade Organisation (WTO)
compliance (27)
The EU, and to a lesser extent the WTO, play
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) a
feel constrained by the existing stock of EU
nationally and believed that future EU polic
Industry and public preferences (19) Views of industry and public reportedly inﬂ
channels (e.g. industry advisory panels, sta
national and international level).
Political preferences (17) Politicians reportedly play an active role in
preference for non-regulatory policy approa
Fairness (12) Interviewees raised fairness as an importan
regulations that are considered unfair are l
Regulated industries reportedly value a ‘lev
at a disadvantage by non-compliant busine
Impact on innovation (5) One respondent emphasised that the use o
Instead regulators should be ﬂexible in lice
allowing the use of innovative technologies
regulation includes stimulating innovation
Ethics (3) One respondent argued that some superma
they therefore offer Fairtrade products. One
improving water quality for both cost and
considerations were considered to be centr
moved on from treating animals as propertcontext of contaminated land, soil erosion, animal and plant disease
control, climate change adaptation planning, chemicals regulation,
ﬂood risk management, reservoir safety and investment in infrastruc-
ture. Risk characteristics raised that reportedly inﬂuence the choice of
instruments are summarised below (parenthesised numbers through-
out indicate the number of respondents who commented on a theme).ntral theme in all discussions. Beneﬁt-risk trade-offs were discussed in regulation
nd plant disease control, climate change mitigation planning, chemicals, ﬂood risk
ent in infrastructure (e.g. for recycling). Beneﬁt-cost tradeoffs were discussed in
animal welfare, payments for ecosystems services (e.g. water companies paying
agri-environment schemes), footpaths, forestry management, energy efﬁcient
cient production.
a signiﬁcant role in the choices made by policymakers in the UK, and policy makers,
nd industry seek to inﬂuence policymaking at the EU level. While many policymakers
regulations, others identiﬁed scope for ﬂexibility in how EU rules are implemented
y design would make more use of approaches not solely based on direct regulation.
uence the choice of regulatory approach through both direct formal engagement
tutory consultation processes), and indirectly through political inﬂuence (at a local,
policymaking, often working directly with policymakers. The current government's
ches featured in narratives of approximately one third of policy makers interviewed.
t characteristic of environmental policy or policymaking, primarily because
ess likely to be accepted by stakeholders, who will make demands for change.
el playing ﬁeld’, where businesses that comply with standards are not placed
sses.
f best available technique requirements in licensing should not limit innovation.
nsing to ensure that the intended environmental outcomes are achieved, while
. Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH)
within the EU chemicals industry as one of its three objectives.
rkets have identiﬁed that their customers want them to behave ethically, and that
believed that water companies had pursued ecosystem-based approaches to
ethical/corporate social responsibility reasons. In the case of animal welfare, ethical
al to how government policy has been designed and implemented; thinking has
y to treating animals as sentient beings.
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require approaches that include local assessment of risks (e.g. ﬂooding,
land contamination, diffuse pollution, biodiversity, chloroﬂuorocarbons
(CFCs), river pollution), andmay require national coordination or inter-
national agreements where impacts cross administrative boundaries.
Impact and likelihood of risk (13): higher impact risks were argued
to require more certain regulatory measures to control them, normally
assumed to be achieved through direct regulation (e.g. reservoir safety,
chemicals, pesticides, air pollution, drinking water quality, release of
invasive species).
Who is affected by risk (6): where the impact of a risk is constrained
to the person or business causing the risk, it was generally argued that
government need not intervene. However, where risks caused by one
party impose impacts on others (e.g. the introduction of animal or
plant disease) or where risks to society remain unmanaged (e.g. risks
arising from climate change not managed by private sector organisa-
tions) it was argued that government intervention may be justiﬁed.
Number and variety of actors and mitigation actions (3): for prob-
lems involving multiple actors and risk mitigation actions (e.g. soil
management, climate change adaptation planning, diffuse pollution)
more complex regulatory approaches using a range of interventions
targeted at different actors were reported to often be necessary.
Understanding of risk (6): risks that are not well understood
(e.g. with respect to their sources in the case of diffuse pollution,
with respect to impact in the case of land contamination and nano-
technology) may require different regulatory approaches compared
to well understood risks. Interviewees discussed adopting a “precau-
tionary approach” or seeking to establish a better evidence base
before direct regulation is adopted as potential strategies to deal
with a lack of knowledge about risks.
Persistence and irreversibility (3): some environmental risks may
have impacts that persist in the environment for many years, or
are irreversible (e.g. some chemicals, invasive species), in which
case stronger controls to reduce residual risk were reported to be
appropriate;
Speed of action required (3): where rapid government action is
required to control the spread of animal disease after an outbreak,
direct regulation was argued to be required, alongside planning and
skills development to improve emergency response. Flood manage-
ment also requires measures (e.g. emergency planning, ﬂood alerts)
to enable a rapid response.
An extensive literature exists on the relationship between charac-
teristics of risks and the forms of regulation that are appropriate
to manage them (e.g. Pollard et al., 2004). In concert, these results
indicate that theories and concepts emerging from both economics
(e.g Perman et al., 2003) and risk analysis (e.g. Kaplan, 1997; Short,
1984) are used by policy makers at Defra to conceptualize explana-
tions for instrument selection, but to varying degrees by different in-
terviewees. This could indicate, among other things, that economics
and risk management theory are of varying relevance in different
policy domains, or that expertise in risk analysis and economics is
not spread evenly among policy makers, or reﬂects a deliberate
avoidance of technical terminology to aid communication clarity.
3.3. Harnessing the inﬂuence of industry, civil society and government
Interviewees described a wide range of actors, characteristics of
actors, and inﬂuences between actors that inﬂuence the effectiveness
of instruments in practice. Table 4 shows the number of interviewees
who discussed particular actor characteristics or interactions and
provides a summary of how these factors reportedly affect the effec-
tiveness of environmental policy and regulation.
Commentators argue thatmodern environmental regulation has been
characterised by a shift from government (the State) to governance
(formalised management, irrespective of actor), with policy makers
increasingly seeking to harness the inﬂuence of non-governmentalactors to strengthen the effectiveness of interventions (see, e.g. Lange
and Gouldson, 2010; Jordan et al., 2005; Gunningham, 2009). It is
clear from these results that policymakers believe that the effectiveness
of policy and regulation is affected by awide range of social and political
forces as summarised in Fig. 2. The extent to which these factors are
relevant varies between policy domains. For example, large UK
supermarkets driven by consumer preferences are considered
powerful inﬂuencers of environmental behaviour in their supply chains.
However, in other domains (e.g. local pollution control) consumer
choice appears less relevant, where instead direct regulatory interven-
tion and co-regulation feature more prominently.
3.4. Design objectives for policy and regulatory frameworks
3.4.1. Coherent mix of instruments
27 respondents discussed the interaction between instruments in
a ‘mix’ as being an important factor in their selection and effective-
ness in practice.
Instruments work in a complementary mix (14): respondents
highlighted various examples of mixes in action. For example, the
regulation of grass-burning uses direct regulation combined with a
voluntary code; the Landﬁll Tax has worked in conjunction with the
Landﬁll Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS; now discontinued) and
infrastructure investment subsidies to improve waste management;
and various instruments are used to reduce ﬂood risk including
development control and public awareness building.
Instruments interfere with each other (6): in some policy areas
(e.g.ﬁsheries policy and agriculture) respondents explained that existing
regulatory frameworks needed to be simpliﬁed, to make them simpler
and easier for regulatees to understand.
Instruments enable other instruments (7): cases of individual
instruments enhancing the impact of existing instruments included
introducing recognised standards in carbon footprinting and sustain-
able production, which could then be used to enable further measures
such as procurement standards or differential taxation.
Instruments preclude other instruments (4): in other cases the
existing regulatory framework can prevent the addition of new in-
struments, for example if existing direct regulation prevents addi-
tional direct regulation, or the scope for additional tax measures may
be constrained by the existing tax system.
Policy makers need to work to coordinate design (12): Defra
policies interact with other departments' policies, for example with
the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)
and Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) on standards
for domestic boilers, or with DCLG for planning policy that can affect
future incidents of noise and nuisance (a Defra responsibility). While
some coordinated policy was thought to have worked well, it remains
a challenge in other areas.
Regulators need to work together to coordinate implementation
(2): coordination is also required at the level of regulatory interven-
tions. For example, the Environment Agency is a statutory consultee
for planning applications managed by local authorities to assess
ﬂood risk impacts. Better coordination of inspections for farmers is
an objective that has arisen from the Farming Regulation Task Force.
While early commentators tended to focus on the relativemerits of
individual instruments to tackle environmental problems, in recent
years attention has turned to the design of complementary instrument
mixes (Howlett and Rayner, 2007). The need for such mixes is widely
recognised among the policy makers interviewed here. While the
Tinbergen Rule would suggest that one instrument is needed for
each policy target (Braathen, 2007), policy makers did not explicitly
refer to the application of this rule in policy design. Policy makers
report some successes in working together to coordinate the design
of mixes across policy areas and departments, but for more complex
policy areas understanding the existing mix in full remains a signiﬁ-
cant challenge.
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21 respondents discussed ways in which instruments need to
exhibit ﬂexibility to remain effective as environmental and economic
conditions vary spatially and temporally, and discussed ways in which
this ﬂexibility can be accommodated in design.
Incorporating ﬂexibility to industry characteristics (7): respon-
dents referred to the need to vary rules according to different indus-
try characteristics. For example, the local pollution control regime has
guidance for 80 different sectors. The use of licensing based on best
available techniques allows regulators to be ﬂexible to speciﬁc busi-
ness circumstances.
Incorporating ﬂexibility to environmental variation (4): inter-
viewees identiﬁed examples where local environmental conditions
vary, for example in ﬁsheries, in land contamination, or in country-
side biodiversity. As local environmental conditions vary, appropriate
regulatory interventions also need to be varied.
Reducing regulation according to risk of business (6): at present,
the Environment Agency can vary inspection charges and frequency
depending on their assessment of the environmental risks posed by
speciﬁc businesses. A similar approach described as ‘earned recognition’
is under consideration in farming, reducing government regulation if
other inspection regimes are in place (e.g. under supermarket animal
welfare schemes).
Using case law to reﬁne regulation (2): one respondent described
how in animalwelfare, case lawhas beenused to deﬁneacceptable treat-
ment of animals, rather than attempting to deﬁne rules to cover all cases
in statute which would have proved infeasible. In contrast, another re-
spondent described the case of contaminated land, where case law has
not proved an effective route to clarify legislation. In this case, UK legis-
lation sets a test of “signiﬁcant possibility of signiﬁcant harm” to identify
when land should be considered contaminated, and provides for statuto-
ry guidance to explain what this means. However, before 2012 statutory
guidance did not provide this clariﬁcation, leaving regulators, businesses
and other stakeholders uncertain over the deﬁnition and therefore the
need for action. No cases went to court to provide case law to clarify
the deﬁnition, partly reﬂecting fear among stakeholders of the implica-
tions of a single case decision for the management of other potentially
contaminated sites. A clariﬁcation of statutory guidance by government
has instead been necessary, giving greater legal certainty and creating
conditions that might enable case law to further reﬁne the test in future.
Modifying policy and regulation over time — ﬂexibility vs certainty
(11): policy makers discussed how policy can be changed over time as
conditions change. In the case of the Courtauld Commitment, the ﬂexi-
bility afforded by this co-regulatory approach was seen by two respon-
dents as advantageous, allowing objectives to change as government
and industry understanding of environmental impacts improved. How-
ever, clear unchanging regulation was also reportedly advantageous,
allowing businesses to make long term investment decisions. One re-
spondent considered the Landﬁll Tax to have worked well because it
provides long term certainty on the increasing cost of landﬁll. Balancing
ﬂexibility with clear long term signals is a challenge for policy makers.
As one respondent put it:
“And it's that balance....there was a report from the Advisory Com-
mittee on Business and the Environment in the late 90s and that
said businesses want both certainty and ﬂexibility. I quote that
back at business from time to time and they say yes that's right.
One minute they'll be asking for one and the next they'll be asking
for the other.”
These results indicate that accommodating ﬂexibility while pro-
viding clarity and certainty for businesses is a signiﬁcant challenge
for Defra policy makers. Some considered the ﬂexibility afforded by
co-regulation to be a signiﬁcant advantage of this approach. Extending
the use of ‘earned recognition’ is an active area of policy development,
particularly in farming.3.5. Social, legal and political preferences and constraints affecting
instrument selection
In addition to the factors affecting effectiveness and instrument
design considerations highlighted above, respondents discussed a
range of other considerations that inﬂuence the choice of instru-
ments. The frequency of these factors being raised is described in
Table 5. A lower number of coding occurrences cannot be interpreted
as reﬂecting a lower level of importance being placed on that factor
by Defra corporately. For example, the relatively low frequency of
explicit discussions of ‘ethics’ does not indicate a low level of concern
about ethics at Defra; only that ethical considerations were explicitly
prioritised in discussion in a relatively small number of policy contexts.
In addition to its effectiveness in achieving environmental objectives,
environmental policy and regulation will also be assessed in terms of its
economic/ﬁnancial and social impacts (BIS, 2011), and these consider-
ations were reﬂected in policy makers' narratives. Given the strong
emphasis placed by commentators on the importance of technological
innovation to address social and environmental challenges and the
potentially deleterious effect of direct regulation on innovation (e.g.
Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999), it is perhaps surprising that innovation
was not discussedmore frequently by policymakers. However, technol-
ogy innovation is perhaps less relevant in someDefra policy areas than it
is in the areas where it was mentioned, notably those concerned with
production and use of technology such as REACH and pollution control.
3.6. Impact of the state of knowledge upon instrument selection
27 respondents referred to the role that evidence (or the lack of
evidence) plays in instrument selection and the strategies adopted to
enable effective policy and regulation under conditions of uncertainty.
Research and policy evaluation (23): many policy areas identiﬁed
government research as an importantmechanism for increasing society's
capacity to understand and manage environmental risks. Some policy
makers expressed conﬁdence in the quality of evaluation evidence
available for regulation in their policy areas, whereas others found evi-
dence to be lacking. For some, policies had not been in place long
enough to show their impact. In others, measurement of impact was
considered to be very challenging.
Evidence may be contested (7): interviewees noted cases where
evidence of harm may be contested, which can reduce regulatee's
willingness to comply with regulation based on the evidence.
Strategies for dealingwith uncertainty— gradual policy development
(7): interviewees discussed how the impetus for government action on
some issues gradually increases over time, so the initial government re-
sponse to an emerging issue may be limited to seeking further informa-
tion or producing a position statement. For example, one respondent
highlighted the gradual hardening of smoking regulation over time as
public attitudes and evidence have evolved. Another characterised the
development of global cooperation on illegal ﬁshing as follows:
“…my experience of that was that you get like a zeitgeist effect.
You know government is doing something on illegal ﬁshing,
Sainsburys and Marks and Spencers and Waitrose get interested…
someone on TV…internationally…an NGO does it; and we all feed
each other so you get that movement together…is it business al-
ready doing it or is it government? Probably in the real world these
things feed off each other.”
Strategies for dealing with uncertainty— adopting a precautionary
approach (4): respondents described the regulation of nanomaterials,
aspects of chemical regulation under REACH, and of land contamina-
tion as “precautionary”, where hazards are known to exist but the risk is
unknown. Respondents described a case by case approach to assessing
the controls required for speciﬁc nanomaterials and chemicals. In land
contamination, site-speciﬁc assessments need to be undertaken
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Fig. 3. Defra's policy cycle (Collier et al., 2010).
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inform the decisions of individual regulators through knowledge shar-
ing and capacity building.
Strategies for dealing with uncertainty — co-regulation (6): respon-
dents noted that co-regulatory approaches can be beneﬁcial where
evidence is lacking or contested. For example, some voluntary
programmes for improving the sustainability of products have initially
focused on establishing an agreed evidence base and building buy-in
from businesses, so that then improvement targets can be agreed. A
new ‘catchment based approach’ for regulating water pollution and use
reportedly shares similar features, where evidence is shared and solu-
tions brokered between stakeholders within a river catchment, to create
a collective understanding of issues and ownership for changes required.
According to commentators, the quality and availability of evidence
onwhich to base policy and regulatory design are expected to be a central
concern for policy makers seeking to implement ‘evidence based policy’
(Solesbury, 2001). Jones (2007) has identiﬁed a range of policy responses
to uncertainty, ranging from simply acknowledging uncertainty
through to ‘adaptive management’. It is clear that for the policy
makers interviewed, the quality and availability of evidence to inform
policymaking have a direct impact on the choice of regulatory instru-
ments deployed. Evidence may however be lacking, or contested. In
some cases, a gradual approach todeveloping policy as evidence develops
has been adopted, whereas in others where hazards are known to exist
but risks are unclear, a precautionary approach has been selected. Policy
makers have argued that their capacity to gradually develop consensus
around accepted evidence and thereby bring about behaviour change is
an important advantage of co-regulatory approaches (notably for im-
proving the sustainability of products and in catchment based planning).
3.7. Capabilities for effective policymaking
Nineteen respondents alluded to skills and processes that affect the
effectiveness of the regulatory reformprocess. Some emphasised the dif-
ﬁculties in understanding the operation of the human and environmen-
tal systems to be inﬂuenced and highlighted a lack of tools to improve
understanding. Unintended consequences of government intervention
can result, which then need to be addressed. As one interviewee put it:
“…you do some research on a problem, you ﬁnd what you think is
a solution, you come up with the policy instruments. Others think
the same thing, everyone's prepared to go for it. You go for it.
You've got to ﬁnd out if it works or not and what the unintended
consequences were because otherwise, you know, there's a repu-
tational risk if you want to suggest something else next time.
You then need to follow up to see if there are unintended conse-
quences that…make things worse because you either need to stop
using the policy instrument or you need a mitigating one.”
Two interviewees highlighted the Defra policy cycle (Collier et al.,
2010) as an iterative process from which to learn (Fig. 3). One inter-
viewee argued that adopting a cautious, incremental approach to regu-
latory reform may well be a sensible strategy to deal with uncertainty
and unintended consequences. This approach to policy making had
been described in a 1970s public policy article as “the art of muddling
through”, and the interviewee felt that that description of policymaking
“very often still holds”.
Three respondents argued that policy makers and regulators would
need new skills in order to establish community- or industry-led regula-
tory approaches in linewith current political priorities. One commented:
“the more you're taking a voluntary or big society or working with
industry approach, the more you need to be able to have the softer
skills and working with people. The really challenging thing is
trying to get people to believe it's in their interest to actually be
doing this particularly if they don't think it is in their interest…
part of it is being able to admit when government doesn'tnecessarily have all the answers which I think is a bit of a culture
shock for some people.”
Seven interviewees discussed the need to think broadly and laterally
when considering the design of new policy. Working across policy
domains to share experience and ideas was thought to help encourage
creative thinking. One interviewee felt that the list of policy options pro-
vided for the interview was useful because it provided a more detailed
explanation of variants than is often discussed and could act as a useful
prompt, although another thought itwas perhaps too detailed and could
discourage policy makers from thinking imaginatively about options.
For this interviewee, good policymaking required the policy maker to
“look at each in case with its merits, think broadly, rule nothing out
and use your nouse.”
While various processes and procedures (e.g. regulatory impact
assessment) have been introduced to improve the quality of decision-
making for regulatory reform, some commentators argue that good
policymaking and regulation remains a craft (notably, Sparrow (2000)).
This analysis illustrates the wide range of skills and processes that pol-
icy makers need to bring to bear in the process of instrument selection,
particularly as new forms of regulation that depend more heavily on
business and civic actors are introduced.
4. Better instrument selection for environmental regulatory reform
This analysis reveals the complexity of the challenge faced by
policymakers in their efforts to reformenvironmental regulation. Policy
makers' choices of policy and regulatory instruments are inﬂuenced by
the suitability of instruments to tackle the intended policy objectives
and targeted environmental risk characteristics, the range of policy in-
struments used previously in practice, the strength of factors enabling
instrument effectiveness in the policy context, instrument design char-
acteristics delivering coherence and ﬂexibility, and a range of social,
legal and political factors. Policy makers' state of knowledge about
these decision inputs, and their capabilities in effective policymaking,
mediate the ﬁnal choices made (Fig. 4).
It is apparent that to suggest that the task of the policy maker is
simply to select the right intervention from the list using a stable
set of rules would be a gross simpliﬁcation of reality and would reﬂect
outmoded faith in the role of “decision support systems” popular in
earlier decades. Policy makers must inter alia seek to understand the
current experience of the regulated, attempt to predict how actors
will respond in a particular context to particular interventions, and
search out opportunities to use existing actors and relationships to
achieve their objectives. A piece-meal approach to regulatory reform
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Fig. 4. Summary logic model of instrument selection emerging from this research.
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inadequate. An approach based on industry engagement (e.g. Farming
Regulation Task Force) may provide a method to highlight cumulative
burdens and also the coherence of policy mix.
Policy maker expertise in both economics and risk analysis is neces-
sary, and an exchange of concepts between specialists may prove bene-
ﬁcial. Policy makers also expressed considerable interest in the insights
provided by behavioural economics, reﬂecting recent interest across the
UK government (e.g. Dolan et al., 2010). This research suggests that be-
havioural research (or “insights”) can inform all regulatory design, so to
see behavioural interventions as a separate class of regulation is to
underplay the breadth of their application. However understanding of
how they can be applied is at an early stage, and their relevance to busi-
ness regulation remains unclear. Further understanding of the subtleties
of regulatory practice, including the use of threats, knowledge exchange,
and the role of credibility will help address this gap.
Policy makers may be assisted in their task by cross-government reg-
ulatory reform programmes, such as the Red Tape Challenge (Cabinet
Ofﬁce, 2012a). Speciﬁcally, such programmes can bring to bear
resources and political inﬂuence to change the complex network of
interactions that affect environmental behaviour. They can also include
well-publicised programmes of public consultation to seek views on
where and how regulatory reform could reduce burdens on business
and the public. The Red Tape Challenge programme includes a public
website that lists all current legislation and invites businesses and the
public to ‘ﬁght back’ to help ‘free up business and society from the burden
of excessive regulation’ by identifying ‘what should be scrapped, what
should be saved and what should be simpliﬁed’ (Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2012a).
The tone of publicity for the review programme has raised concern
among pro-environmental groups (see, e.g. The Royal Society for the
Protection of Birds (RSPB), 2012). A regulatory reformprogrammedriven
simply by a public vote onwhich regulations to change or removewould
risk removing elements from this network of inﬂuences in ways that
undermine cumulative environmental protection in detrimental ways,
unanticipated by voters. However, the Red Tape Challenge programme
also incorporates other elements of public and industry engagement, po-
litical scrutiny and policymaking by expert practitioners (Cabinet Ofﬁce,
2012b); elements which this analysis suggests are all essential for effec-
tive policymaking.While the long term impact of the recently completed
environment element of the Red Tape Challenge review (Defra, 2012)
cannot yet be assessed, the Environmental Data Services (ENDS) Report
summarises opinion among stakeholders that initial fears of a ‘bonﬁre of
environmental law’ appear to be ‘overstated’, with recommendations
focusing on merger and simpliﬁcation of existing rules (ENDS, 2012).5. Conclusions
This research has gathered new evidence of the factors that inﬂu-
ence which instruments are effective in delivering their intended en-
vironmental outcomes in which circumstances, and why this is the
case. It also provides insight into the realities of policymaking by
practitioners, and the skills and tools required for the regulatory craft.
1) The reﬁned typology of instruments (Annex A) provides a com-
prehensive summary of policy and regulatory instruments from
which policy makers may choose, but does not express how in-
struments work together in a mix. The typology may prove most
useful as a stimulus for policy makers considering options for reg-
ulatory reform and provide a framework for organising evidence
of what works when and why;
2) The effectiveness of instruments in practice was reported to be
inﬂuenced by a wide range of interactions between government, in-
dustry and civil actors, and by their respective motivations and capa-
bilities. The relevance and strength of these factors vary from one
policy context to the next, so the feasibility of using a given instrument
depends on the policy context. The design of instruments, particularly
with respect to their coherence in a mix with others and their ﬂexi-
bility to accommodate variations in actor and environmental
characteristics, was also reported to inﬂuence their effectiveness;
3) Interviewees generally considered direct regulation to be neces-
sary in circumstances where high impact public risks occur. The
scope for the use of alternative approaches to direct regulation re-
portedly depends signiﬁcantly on the strength of supply chain re-
lationships, the capacity of the regulated sector to self-regulate,
the strength of political commitment to regulation, and the expo-
sure of businesses to public and NGO scrutiny. For some sectors
regulated by Defra conditions for effective co- and self-regulation
reportedly exist. However in others the scope for self-regulation
may be more limited. One emerging advantage of a co-regulatory
approach over law-based direct regulation is reportedly the ability
to accommodate changes in direction as knowledge about the na-
ture of environmental problems improves.
4) Policymakers described iterative approaches to policy and regulatory
design, taking place under conditions of signiﬁcant uncertainty and
inﬂuenced by social, legal and political factors. The accounts of prac-
titioners highlight their need for a wide skill set to design effective
policy, including social science expertise in economics and risk anal-
ysis, organisational design, and softer skills in negotiation, openness
to new ideas and alertness to new opportunities for alternative ap-
proaches. Hard rules to direct optimal instrument selection appear
very difﬁcult if not impossible to deﬁne; at best ‘rules of thumb’ can
be identiﬁed. The recurring factors identiﬁed that inﬂuence instru-
ment selection (Fig. 2 and Tables 4 and 5) could form the basis for a
more systematic approach to analysing instrument mixes for regula-
tory reform, although its utility for policy makers remains untested.
The analysis presented here is limited to the perspective of govern-
ment policy makers. Regulated businesses and regulatory agencies
have ﬁrst-hand experience of the nuances of regulatory interactions,
analysis of whichwould complement this research. Further qualitative
research will examine and contrast these perspectives.
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Appendix A. Revised version of instrument typology reﬂecting comments made during interviews.
Table A1
Reﬁned version of instrument typology in detail (modiﬁcations emphasised in grey).
Example applicationsDescriptionVariantType
Doing nothing − Government chooses not to act as policy objectives will be achieved without government intervention.  − 
Ambient pollution 
requirements 
The regulator specifies required maximum levels of ambient pollution, allowing flexibility to polluters to decide how 
to achieve that level. In the EU, ambient targets have been set within EU directives, which members states tackle    
Water quality targets, air pollution targets  
Input restrictions 
and output quotas 
Restrictions are applied in the use or output of products. If a material or practice is considered to be sufficiently 
harmful its use may be restricted or banned entirely, with penalties enforced for violations of the ban. Where banned   
materials remain in use, their disposal will need to be carefully controlled.  
Restrictions in pesticide or fertiliser use, restrictions in 
Non-transferable 
emissions 
licences 
Typically a regulator issues a non-transferable licence, in the UK often referred to as a permit, to a business  that gives
authorisation to operate according to specified environmental performance requirements, for example maximum
permitted levels of emissions. The regulator monitors the operation to ensure compliance, and may enforce penalties     
for non-compliance. Conditional exemption from regulation (e.g. exemption from inspections in response to good 
performance) can also  act to incentivise behaviour change. 
Controls on emissions to air and water, controls on waste 
Direct 
"command 
and control" 
regulation 
Technology and 
process controls 
The regulator sets environmental performance objectives and specifies or agrees appropriate processes or abatement 
“best available technique” (BAT).  
Mandatory use of catalytic converters in road vehicles, use of 
process standards (e.g. for animal housing and husbandry)  
Zoning/ location 
controls 
Human impacts on the environment in  a particular area can be controlled through spatial controls, which can be Low emissions zones in urban areas, building development 
fishing zones, marine conservation areas, nitrate vulnerable
Taxes and 
subsidies 
Environmental taxes and subsidies operate by changing the market price of a good or service, reducing or increasing Taxes on emissions to air, land, and on resource use. Subsidies 
Tradable rights systems work  by specifying a quantity of allowances, eg to abstract water or to emit carbon, which
allowances that maximises the cost-effectiveness of using the allowance 
Individual tradable quotas for fisheries, water abstraction 
Conditional payments may be made to incentivise a particular activity. 'Payments for Environmental Services' (PES) Agri-environment payments, conservation payments, deposit 
Economic 
instruments 
Insurance A business or individual may pay a premium to an insurer who in exchange will provide a payment should an event Flood insurance, Livestock disease insurance  
Information 
based 
instruments 
Targeted 
information 
provision/ 
education 
Information is made available by public or private bodies to enable businesses or individuals to make better- Training programmes, advisory bodies (eg UK Carbon Trust 
Naming and 
shaming/faming 
Information is made available describing the environmental performance of businesses, through for example a Emissions inventories, public accolades and prizes, adverse
Registration, 
labelling and 
certification 
Typically information describing the environmental performance of the businesses delivering a product or service is Food labelling, electrical product labelling 
Codes of practice A set of rules or conventions describing good practice. May be used to clarify good practice to accompany Heather and Grass Burning Code 
Payments
Tradable rights
through their national policy mix
technologies with industry. Variations of standards include application of “best practicable environmental option” 
(BPEO), “best  practicable means” (BPM), “best available techniques not entailing  excessive cost” (BATNEEC) and      
 used to mandate practices in a given area, locate polluters away from people and sensitive ecosystems, to prevent
 clustering of harmful activities, or (less commonly) to move people away from sources of harm.    
 the quantity demanded and supplied in the market    
 can then be traded amongst users. The system is designed to create an opportunity cost of using an allowance, and 
therefore also creates benefits from not using an allowance. Trading allows market actors to find the allocation of    
involve beneficiaries (state or private) paying ecosystem managers for the benefits delivered by those ecosystems.    
take place. Government may assign liability for damage to people or the environment creating the need for insurance
 (e.g. mandatory third-party insurance for vehicle drivers, environmental liability insurance), and  may seek to ensure 
that the commercial insurance market is able to provide insurance for risks in lieu of government compensation.         
informed decisions that impact upon the environment.  
publicised inventory of toxic emissions, with the intention of incentivising better environmental behaviour through 
avoided damage to or enhancement of corporate reputation.        
made available to consumers using a product label, enabling consumers to choose products with better 
environmental performance.    
mandatory rules.   
production of potentially harmful chemicals   
production and disposal  
specific pollution abatement technologies, application of   
controls, national parks and conservation areas, controlled  
 zones  
to support renewable energy  
rights, emissions trading eg for CO
2
, SOx, discharge to water   
return payments  
and Energy Savings Trust)    
 publicity associated with prosecutions  
(continued on next page)
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Voluntary 
regulation 
A group of businesses, often organised through a trade association, chooses to apply environmental performance Responsible Care Initiative in chemicals industry  
Covenants and 
negotiated 
agreements 
In this approach government makes an agreement with target businesses to achieve particular standards, which Packaging reduction agreements, recycling agreements, 
pollution reduction agreements 
Private corporate 
regulation 
Businesses may choose to apply environmental standards both within their organisation and along their supply Food retailer sustainability programmes, government
procurement requirements 
Co-regulation 
and self-
regulation 
Private 
professional 
regulation 
A professional body acts to apply standards through  conditions of membership.  Membership of professional bodies 
Businesses may choose unilaterally to apply environmental performance standards, for example by adopting an Environmental management systems, unilateral commitments
to good performance 
Civic organisations, for example conservation charities or local community groups, may apply pressure to businesses Activities of NGOs and community groups 
Research and 
knowledge 
generation 
Governments or other actors may undertake research to increase knowledge that informs better environmental Funding of university research 
Demonstration 
projects and 
knowledge 
diffusion 
Governments may choose to invest in demonstration projects to demonstrate feasibility, raise awareness and reduce Carbon capture and storage, sustainable agriculture practice,
eco-homes and buildings  
Support 
mechanisms 
and capacity 
building 
Network building 
and joint problem 
solving 
Initiatives designed to encourage people to exchange ideas and learning to improve environmental performance.  Discussion groups, conferences, networking events  
Self-regulation
Civic regulation
 standards as a condition of membership of an industry group.    
forms a contract and may incursanctions if the contract is not met. This may be enforced through inspection by non-
government regulators.     
chain, so that the purchasing business is effectively acting as a regulator of suppliers’ performance. Government may
 enforce procurement standards that then propagate along supply chains.      
externally monitored standard such as ISO14001 or EU EMAS, or as a feature of corporate social responsibility 
commitments.    
to improve environmental performance through scrutiny of their behaviour and publicising good or bad performance.    
decision making.  
risks of new technologies or processes. This investment could be managed through a specially designed investment
 institution, such as the UK's planned Green Investment Bank.    
Example applicationsDescriptionVariantType
Table A1 (continued)
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